The Hacker Chronicles - A…the Computer Underground/The Hacker Chronicles - A Tour of the Computer Underground (P-80 Systems).iso/cud1/cud118e.txt

Text File | 1992-09-26 | 13KB | 296 lines

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                  >C O M P U T E R   U N D E R G R O U N D<
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              ***  Volume 1, Issue #1.18 (June 25, 1990)   **
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MODERATORS:   Jim Thomas (Sole moderator:  Gordon Meyer on vacation)
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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***  CuD, Issue #1.18 / File 5 of 5 /                       ***
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In CuD 1.05, we reprinted FOIA information from Marc Rotenberg of CPSR
(Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, 1025 Connecticut Avenue,
NW (Suite 1015), Washington, D.C. (20036) - [phone])).  Marc
provided a copy of a response by the FBI to U.S. Representative Don Edwards
(chair, House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights on the
Judiciary). Mr. Edwards submitted a list of questions to the FBI asking
about surveillance of BBSs. We reprint with permission and thanks.
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                                         DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
                                         UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
                                          WASHINGTON, DC 20223
                                         APR 30 1990

 The Honorable Don Edwards
 Chairman
 Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
 Committee on the Judiciary
 House of Representatives
 Washington,  D.C.  20515

 Dear Mr. Chairman:

 Thank you for your letter of April 3, 1990, concerning your
 committee's interest in computer fraud.  We welcome the
 opportunity to discuss this issue with your committee and I
 hope the following responses adequately answer your
 questions.

 Question 1:

 Please describe the  Secret Service's process for investigating
 computer related crimes under Title 18, United States Code,
 Section 1030 and any other related statutes.

 Response:

 The process by which the  Secret Service investigates
 computer related crimes is similar to the methods we use to
 investigate other types of criminal investigations.  Most of the
 investigative techniques are the  same; surveillances, record
 checks, witness and suspect interviews, etc.  the primary
 difference is we had to develop resources to assist in the
 collection and review of computer evidence.

 To provide  our agents with this expertise, the secret service
 developed a computer fraud investigation course which, as of
 this date, has trained approximately 150 agents in the proper
 methods for conducting a computer fraud investigation.
 Additionally, we established a computer  Diagnostics center,
 staffed  with computer professional, to review evidence on
 computer  systems.

 Referals of computer related criminal investigations occur in
 much the same manner as any other case.  A victim sustains a
 loss and reports the crime, or, a computer related crime is
 discovered during the course of another investigation.

 In the investigations  we do select, it is not our intention to
 attempt to supplant local or state law enforcement.  We
 provide enforcement in those cases that are interstate or
 international in nature and for one reason or another are
 beyond the capability of state and local law enforcement
 agencies.

 When computer related crimes are referred by the various
 affected industries to the local field offices, the Special
 Agent in  Charge (SAIC) determines which cases will be
 investigated based on a variety of criteria.  Each SAIC must
 consider the economic impact of each case, the prosecutive
 guidelines of the United States Attorney, and the investigative
 resources available in the office to investigate the case .
 In response to the other portion of your question, the other
 primary statute we use to investigate computer related crimes
 is Title 18, United States  Code,  Section 1029 ( Access Device
 Fraud).  This service  has primary jurisdiction in those cases
 which are initiated outside a bank and do not involve
 organized crime, terrorism, or foreign counterintelligence
 (traditional responsibilities of the FBI).

 The term "access device" encompasses credit cards, debit
 cards, automatic teller machines (ATM) cards, personal
 identification numbers (PIN's) used to activate ATM machines,
 credit or debit card account numbers, long distance telephone
 access codes, computer passwords and logon sequences, and
 among other things the computer chips in cellular car phones
 which assign billing.

 Additionally, this Service has primary jurisdiction in cases
 involving electronic fund transfers by consumer (individuals)
 under Title 15, U. S. code, section 169n (Electronic Fund
 Transfer Act).  This could involve any scheme designed to
 defraud EFT systems used by the public, such as pay by phone
 systems, home banking, direct deposit, automatic payments,
 and violations concerning automatic teller machines.  If the
 violations can be construed to be a violation of the  banking
 laws by bank employee, the FBI would have primary
 jurisdiction.

 There are many other statutes which have been used to
 prosecute computer criminals but it is within the purview of
 the U.S. Attorney to determine which statute will be used to
 prosecute an individual.

 Question 2:

 Has the Secret  Service ever monitored any computer bulletin
 boards or networks?  Please describe  the procedures for
 initiating such monitoring, and list those computer bulletin
 boards or networks monitored by the Secret  Service since
 January 1988.

 Response:

 Yes, we have occasionally monitored computer bulletin boards.
 The monitoring occurred after we received complaints
 concerning criminal activity on a particular computer bulletin
 board.  The computer bulletin boards were monitored as part of
 an official investigation and in accordance with the directives
 of the Electronic Communications  Privacy  Act of 1986 (Title
 18 USC 2510)

 The procedures used to monitor computer bulletin boards
 during an official investigation have involved either the use of
 an informant (under the direct supervision of the investigating
 agent)  or an agent operating in an undercover capacity.  In
 either case, the informant or agent had received authorization
 from the computer bulletin board's owner/operator to access
 the system.

 We do not keep records of the bulletin boards which we have
 monitored but can provide information concerning a particular
 board if we are given the name of the board.

 Question 3:

 Has the Secret Service or someone acting its direction ever
 opened an account on a computer bulletin board or network?
 Please describe the procedures for opening such an account and
 list those bulletin boards or networks on which such accounts
 have been opened since January 1988.

 Response:

 Yes, the U.S.  Secret Service has on many occasions, during the
 course of a criminal investigation, opened accounts on
 computer bulletin boards or networks.

 The procedure for opening an account involves asking the
 system administrator/operator for permission to access to the
 system.  Generally, the system administrator/operator will
 grant everyone immediate access to the computer bulletin
 board but only for lower level of the system.  The common
 "pirate" computer bulletin boards associated with most of
 computer crimes have many different level in their systems.
 The first level is generally available to the public and does not
 contain any information relation to criminal activity.  Only
 after a person has demonstrated unique computer skills, been
 referred by a known "hacker," or provided stolen long-distance
 telephone access codes or stolen credit card account
 information,  will the system administrator/operator permit a
 person to access the higher levels of the bulletin board system
 which contains the information on the criminal activity.

 As previously reported in our answer for Question 2, we do not
 keep records of the computer bulletin boards on which we have
 established accounts.

 Question 4:

 Has the Secret Service or someone acting under its direction
 ever created a computer bulletin board or network that was
 offered to the public?  Please describe any such bulletin board
 or networks.

 Response:

 No, the U. S. Secret Service has not created a computer bulletin
 board nor a network which was offered to members of the
 public.   We have created an undercover bulletin board which
 was offered to a select number of individuals who had
 demonstrated an interest in conducting criminal activities.
 This was done with the guidance of the U.S. Attorney's  office
 and was consistent with the Electronic Communications
 Privacy Act.

 Question 5:

 Has the Secret Service ever collected, reviewed or
 "downloaded" transmissions or information from any computer
 network or bulletin board?  What procedures does the Secret
 Service have for obtaining information from computer bulletin
 boards or networks?  Please list the occasions where
 information has been obtained since January 1988, including
 the identity of the bulletin boards or networks,  the type of
 information obtained,   and how that information was obtained
 (was it downloaded, for example).

 Response:

 Yes, during the course of several investigations, the U. S.
 Secret Service has "down loaded" information from computer
 bulletin boards.  A review of information gained in this manner
 (in an undercover capacity after being granted access to the
 system by it's system administrator)  is performed in order to
 determine whether or not that bulletin board is being used to
 traffic in unauthorized access codes or to gather other
 information of a criminal intelligence nature.  At all times,
 our methods are in keeping with the procedures as outlined in
 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).

 If a commercial network was suspected of containing
 information concerning a criminal activity, we would obtain
 the proper court order to obtain this information in keeping
 with the ECPA.

 The U. S. Secret Service does not maintain a record  of the
 bulletin boards we have accessed.

 Question 6:

 Does the Secret Service employ, or is it considering employing,
 any system or program that could automatically review the
 contents of a computer file, scan the file for key items,
 phrases or data elements, and flag them or recommend further
 investigative action?  If so, what is the status of any such
 system.  Please describe this system and research being
 conducted to develop it.

 Response:

 The Secret  Service has pioneered the concept of a Computer
 Diagnostic Center (CDC)  to facilitate the review and
 evaluation of electronically stored information.  To streamline
 the tedious task of reviewing thousands of files per
 investigation, we have gathered both hardware and software
 tools to assist our search of files for specific information or
 characteristics.  Almost all of these products are
 commercially  developed products and are available to the
 public.  It is conceivable that an artificial intelligence process
 may someday be developed and have application to this law
 enforcement function but we are unaware if such a system is
 being developed.

 The process of evaluating the information and making
 recommendations for further investigative action is currently
 a manual one at our CDC.  We process thousands of computer
 disks annually as well as review evidence contained in other
 types of storage devices (tapes, hard drives, etc.).   We are
 constantly seeking  ways to enhance our investigative mission.
 The development of high tech resources like the CDC saved
 investigative manhours and assist in the detection  of criminal
 activity.

 Again, thank you for your interest.  Should you have any further
 questions, we will be happy to address them.

                                                 Sincerely,
                                                 /s/
                                                 John R.  Simpson, Director


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Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253 12yrs+